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Abstract
The holding of early parliamentary elections in Togo on October 14, 2007, most likely 
the first free and fair Togolese elections since decades, are considered internationally as 
a litmus test of despotic African regimes’ propensity to change towards democratization 
and economic prosperity. Western donors took Togo as model to test their approach of 
political conditionality of aid, which had been emphasised as corner stone of the joint 
EU-Africa strategy. Recent empirical findings on the linkage between democratization 
and economic performance are challenged in this paper. It is open to question, whether 
Togo’s expected economic consolidation and growth will be due to democratization of 
its institutions or to the improved external environment, notably the growing 
competition between global players for African natural resources. 
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2Zusammenfassung
Togo: Fehlgeschlagene Wahlen und fehlgeleitete Entwicklungshilfe als Wurzeln der 
gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftsmisere
Die anstehenden Parlamentswahlen in Togo am 14. Oktober 2007 sind wahrscheinlich 
die ersten freien und fairen Wahlen Togos seit Jahrzehnten. Sie werden international als 
Lackmustest für die politische und ökonomische Wandlungsfähigkeit despotischer 
Regime in Afrika gesehen. Die Ergebnisse neuerer empirischer Analysen über den 
Zusammenhang von Demokratisierung und Wirtschaftsentwicklung in afrikanischen 
LDCs werden in diesem Papier in Frage gestellt. Es ist fraglich, ob die erwartete 
positive Beeinflussung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung eher durch Togos 
demokratischere Institutionen oder durch verbesserte externe Rahmenbedingungen, wie 
den zunehmenden Wettstreit der global players um Afrikas natürlichen Ressourcen 
bewirkt wird.
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31. Introduction 
When the longest-serving African dictator, Togo's Gnassingbé Eyadéma, died 
unexpectedly in February 2005 after 38 years of autocratic rule, Togo became a test 
case for indigenous democratisation efforts of African states. However, it soon became 
clear that a change of regime through the ballot box was impossible, in view of the 
consolidation of this dictatorship, reinforced by  decades of misrouted foreign 
assistance, as shown below. Political conflict flared up again. Eyadéma’s son, Faure 
Gnassingbé, seized power in a coup with the backing of the army and the Barons of the 
ruling party RPT (Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais; Rally of the Togolese People). 
Violent protest at home and diplomatic pressure of major donors and African peers 
forced Gnassingbé to hold presidential elections in April 2005. But as the elections were 
rigged right from the beginning in order to preserve the power of the Gnassingbé-clan, it 
was no surprise that they confirmed the power of the incumbent as heir to the throne of 
his father. 
In the interest of political stability in the sub-region, neighbouring states, 
France, the former colonial power, and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) condoned the election results as well as gross violation of human 
rights, including the brutal political persecution of opponents. About 700 people died 
and some 40,000 fled to neighbouring Benin and Ghana in fear of reprisals. On the 
comfortable base of his usurped power, the president and his entourage reluctantly 
yielded to the request of the international donor community and the opposition for 
national reconciliation. The political accord between the government and major 
opposition parties in August 2006 was welcomed internationally as a major 
breakthrough in the aftermath of rigged presidential elections and subsequent political 
turmoil in 2005. The formation of a transitional government of national unity under 
Yawovi Agboyibo (16.09.06), renowned opposition leader, gave rise to optimistic 
forecasts concerning the preparations for early free and fair parliamentary elections in 
October 2007, which would be the first after decades of autocratic rule. This is also 
expected by many observers to bring to an end 15 years of economic hardship, caused 
by the political crisis and ruthless repression of political opponents as well as by 
international isolation of the country, including the disengagement by major donors in 
view of the ‘democratization deficit’ since 1993. 
4In the following sub-chapters I shall analyse the political background of these 
presidential elections in Togo, against the long history of political repression in this 
country, which was renowned up to the end of the 1980s for its prosperity, and often 
labelled the Swiss of Africa. A discussion of Togo’s failed democratization and its 
impact on economic performance, including its aftermath for the poorest sections of the 
country will be followed by a summary of lessons learned. An outlook of the prospects 
for democratic renewal and economic consolidation, starting with the coming 
parliamentary elections of October 2007 will conclude the chapter.
2. Background  
The history of independent Togo is a show case of the unholy alliance of misguided 
post-colonial Africa policy and the quest of African autocrats for unlimited personal 
power. The murder of the first President of the newly independent Togo, Sylvanus 
Olympio, on January 13, 1963, by a group of Togolese veterans of the French colonial 
army, led by sergeant Etienne Gnassingbé (later called Eyadéma) and tolerated, if not 
instigated by the former French colonial power, opened up a Pandora’s box (cf. 
Toulabor 1986; Decalo 1987; Cornevin 1988; Kohnert 2005). It was the first violent 
coup in the history of independent sub-Saharan Africa. Although unanimously 
condemned by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the beginning, African 
statesmen soon turned back to normal. Military coups, often backed by Could War 
politics of Western powers, became a familiar solution of political contest in Africa up 
to date. The autocratic rule of Eyadéma, formally installed in 1967, was supported by 
major donors because of its unwavering baking of Western positions in East-West 
cleavages, like the Hallstein Doctrine, meant to prevent international recognition of East 
Germany. Over decades Togo was put on the drip of development aid, which 
represented 40% to 82% of real GDI p.a.2. 
2 Cf. Worldbank: African Development Indicators 2004; WB, Washington/D.C., 2005:296. – The real 
Gross Domestic Income is in this case a better standard of comparison as the GDP, because it takes 
account income losses due to unfavourable development of terms of trade, too. – Compared with public 
revenue, excluding grants of other governments or international aid organisations, Official Development 
Aid (ODA) to Togo amounted to 62% between 1985 to 1992; in the following years (1993 to 2002) it 
decreased only slightly to 57% (World Bank: African Development Indicators, various years, 
Washington/DC: World Bank). Alone bilateral ODA of the Federal Republic of Germany (Western 
Germany) amounted to DM 600 Mio. between 1960 to 1989, supplemented by debt cancellation of DM 
295.5 Mio. Even the disengagement of ODA starting from 1993, because of gross human rights violation 
5Although Togo was often labelled euphemistically up to the end of the 1980s 
the ‘Swiss of Africa’, Eyadémas’, economic policy was neither development oriented 
nor aiming at pro-poor growth. Nevertheless, Togo gained relative prosperity up to the 
early 1980s because of its role as transit-economy for neighbouring countries. Not only 
for land-locked Sahel-countries like Burkina Faso or Niger, but also for Ghana, subdued 
by a severe economic crisis, and last but not least for Nigeria which followed an import-
substitution policy. Therefore, the effective demand for consumer goods which could 
not be satisfied on the markets of Accra or Lagos, was redirected to the informal market 
networks at Lomé. The economic decline of the country, reinforced by growing political 
repression, started already about 1985 and continued up to date. Most Togolese citizens 
of today are poorer than twenty years ago (cf. WB 1996; Lejeal/Agbessi 2004:2332-36). 
Eyadéma’s despotism was based on three pillars: First, an army (Forces Armées 
Togolaises, FAT), organized like a Praetorian guard, as well as security services and 
pro-Eyadéma militias, dominated by members of the ethnic group of the president 
(Kabiyè). In 1991, for the first time ever, detailed data on the army were published 
during the hearings of the National Conference. They show that officers and troops 
belonged overwhelmingly to the Kabiyè, six of the officers were even from Pya, the 
home village of Eyadéma (nearby the Provincial capital Kara, the headquarters of the 
Gnassingbé-clan), one of the reasons why the army was nicknamed in public as ‘army 
of cousins’ (cf. Toulabour 2005). The military was systematically upgraded with foreign 
assistance, notably of France, within the framework of secret pacts of mutual assistance. 
In the reconstruction period, following the murder of Sylvanus Olympia (1963-67), 
Togo’s military expenditure topped the list of all African states, and still in 1991 it 
counted – per capita - among the largest armies of the world. Ethnic instrumentalization 
of the army and security services  and the militarisation of key-positions in the economy 
did not stop with mounting critic of international donors since 1993. Quite to the 
contrary, Eyadéma promoted again four ‘nordistes’ to the rank of brigadiers in 1998, 
other high ranking pro-Eyadéma officers were promoted to key positions in the 
administration, including parastatals. Nevertheless, the army was no homogenous block, 
as the social and political differentiation between rank and file, between ‘nordistes’ and 
and bad government of the Eyadéma Regime, was not as radical as might be supposed in view of official 
declarations on aid conditionality. Even Bonn, which increasingly fell apart with Paris over continuing 
aid to Lomé, paid between 1998 and 2003 between € 8 and 10 Mio. of bilateral aid to Togo. 
6‘sudistes’ showed, which also explained their differentiated sympathy for the 
democratisation movement. 
The second pillar was a centralized neo-patrimonial network of political and economic 
power, dominated by ethnicity and politics of xenophobia3, the third the 
instrumentalization of African occult belief systems for political means (cf. Kohnert 
2005; Toulabor 1999; 1986; Ellis 1993). The latter was crucial, although much 
neglected in literature, and by no means restricted to the person of Eyadéma, nor to the 
ideological underpinning and legitimization of the worldly power of the head of state. 
Public hearings and testimonies during the National Conference of 1991 revealed the 
fabric of a well structured system of occult despotism, including political motivated 
witch-hunts and ritual murder, on nearly all levels of public administration from the top, 
down to the level of simple district heads (cf. Ellis 1993:472; Dovi 1992:14). It even did 
not stop short of accusing political dissidents from Eyadéma’s own ethnic Kabiyè 
(Kabre) group or his own extended family4. The informal rule of traditional chiefs was 
adapted to the needs of despotism by the politics of ‘authenticity’, i.e. the reference to 
(re-invented) traditional rules, and by the forced ‘alignment’ of chiefs in the National 
Confederation of traditional rulers of Togo (L’Union Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels 
du Togo, UNCTT) created in August 1969 (cf. Decalo 1996). Thus, still in 1997 the 
official website of the Togolese government propagated a very special meaning of 
3 An example of political instrumentalized xenophobia concerns the politics of ‚Togolité’, as codified by 
the revision of the constitution of 2002. Thereby, exiled opponents and refugees were treated as 
‘foreigners’, who could not any more qualify for public offices. Another example is the differentiation 
between ‘authentic’, ‘original’, or ‘true’ Togolese, propagated by government media vis à vis the so 
called ‘Southern immigrants’, i. e. the Ewé ethnic group, which immigrated centuries ago from 
neighbouring Ghana; many of its members belonged to the opposition, and were therefore labelled 
‘stateless vagabonds’ or ‘traitors’ (cf. Toulabour 2003). Already in the 1970s the government in Lomé 
blamed the so-called ‘Brazilians’, i.e. Togolese of Latin American-African descent, notably the 
descendants of returned ex-slaves and slave dealers from Brazil, like the wealthy families of Da Zouza, 
Olympio or d’Almeida, and re-immigrants from Sierra Leone or Nigeria, like the Lawsons, living  in 
Southern Togo, of preparing a coup (cf. Decalo 1996:50, 73-74).
4 Interestingly enough, there existed at least four Togolese concentration camps for political detainees, 
situated near Kazaboua, Agombio, Mandouri and Otadi in the northern parts of the country. Kazaboua, at 
the outskirts of the village of Kaza, about 12 km from Kazaboua, was notorious because of the 
imprisonment of so-called ‘witches’, where also political dissidents accused of occult practices, were 
imprisoned, tortured or murdered. It was constructed under dubious circumstances with assistance of a 
pioneer unit of the German army, under the cover of bilateral military co-operation and armament grant in 
the early 1980s (cf. Kohnert 1997: 43; Codjie, 1991).
A deep and rewarding insight into the occult aspects of informal politics in Africa, taking the 
(veiled) example of Eyadéma, offers the satiric novel of the late Ivorian writer Ahmadou Kourouma, 
(2003) „Waiting for wild beasts to vote”, (‘En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages’). Although presented 
in form of fiction, it is based on painstaking research of the author into the fabric of informal politics in 
Togo and other francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa, putting the pertinent questions by means of 
an African praise singer (griot); cf. the detailed book reviews of this oeuvre by C. Toulabor and others, 
7African democracy: „En démocratie africaine, tout est négociable, sauf le chef!“ 
Autocratic rule was already formally legitimated by the introduction of a one-party state 
of the RPT in 1969, and ten years later consolidated by a redefinition of the constitution 
according to the requirements of one-party rule in 1979. 
The ‘second wind of change’ in Africa strengthened political opposition in 
Togo which called for democratic transition. Following the example of neighbouring 
Benin, representatives of major politically relevant social groups instituted a Sovereign 
National Conference in Lomé in July 1991, thereby encouraging an heated public 
debate about the nature of the Eyadéma regime (cf. Seely 2005; Iwata 2000; Ellis 1993; 
Nwajiaku 1994; Heilbrunn 1993). It condemned the human rights violations of the 
Eyadéma regime and decided upon the repeal of much of the Presidents power, 
including the installation of a transitory government with Kokou Koffigoh, leader of the 
former Togolese Human Rights League (LTDH) as prime minister. A military coup of 
Eyadéma against the new transitional government (Dec. 3, 1991) and the brutal 
repression of anti-government demonstrations as well as political persecution of 
opponents in the following two years triggered a hitherto unknown wave of politically 
motivated migration of some 350.000 refugees to the neighbouring countries Benin and 
Ghana. Hideously rigged presidential elections in 1993 and 1998, as well as fraudulent 
parliamentary elections of 1994, 1999 and 2002, all strongly criticized by international 
election monitors, resulted in a consolidation of the power of the Eyadéma fiefdom. 
Since February 1993 all major donors suspended their aid programs with the Togolese 
government because of its gross human rights abuses. But then controversial 
discussions within the EU, notably the hardly veiled pro-Eyadéma stand of Paris, which 
wanted to safeguard its special relations with its former colony, prevented decisions in 
line with the positions of the German and British governments that pushed for more 
vigorous sanctions against Lomé, including a temporary removal of the EU’s 
preferential trade regime within the framework of the Lomé IV and Cotonou agreement 
(cf. CountryWatch 2002:17).
published in Politique Africaine 75 (1999): 171-77, and the complementing interview with Kourouma, 
pp. 178-83.
83. Run-up to the presidential election 
With the sudden death of president Eyadéma in February 2005, Togo became a test case 
for the viability of indigenous democratisation efforts of African states under the newly 
instituted NEPAD regime (New Partnership for Africa’s Development; including its key 
element, the African Peer Review Mechanism, APRM) of the African Union, adopted in 
July 2001 (cf. Melber 2006a; Kanbur 2004; Abrahamsen 2004). However, the 
outcome of this test was rather disappointing. Although the longest-serving dictator of 
Africa had died, the despotic power structure of the Eyadéma-Gnassingbé clan, deeply 
engrained in the political and social fabric of the society, was very much alive, and it 
acted like feudal European king makers. 
Immediately after the death of the head of state, borders and radio stations were 
closed down and demonstrations banned. Parliamentary President Fambaré Natchaba 
Ouattara, who hurried back from a visit to Paris to take over the interims presidency, as 
stipulated by the constitution, was barred to enter the country. Backed by the army, the 
undemocratically elected parliament, composed mainly of members of the ruling party 
(RPT), which held all but two of the parliamentary seats, deposed Natchaba. On 
February 6, 2005, it enthroned one of the sons of late Eyadéma, Faure Gnassingbé as his 
successor until the end of the mandate of the deceased in 2008, in blatant break of 
relevant provisions of the constitution. The designated heir of his father had been first 
elected into parliament in 2002. At that time he was put in charge of the strategic 
important portfolio of the Ministry of Equipment, Mines, Post and Telecommunications, 
which allowed him control of the phosphate mines, a major foreign exchange earner and 
a secret ‘war chest’ of the Eyadéma clan. Constitutional stipulations, demanding new 
elections within 60 days after the death of the president, were disregarded by the 
parliament as well under the pretext to prevent a political power vacuum. This flagrant 
violation of the constitution reminded of another ‘constitutional coup’ of the Eyadéma-
Regime in December 2002, the first since the advent of ‘democratic renewal’ in 
Western Africa. At that time the tree-quarter majority of the RPT in parliament had 
already voted for a change of the constitution in order to guarantee the continuity of the 
political power of the Eyadéma clan in three crucial domains. First, it changed article 59 
of the constitution, which now allowed for a third term of office of the president. 
Second, it revised article 62, which in its new version reduced the minimum age of 
9presidential candidates from 45 to 35 years, to allow the candidature of Fauré 
Ganassingbé, the young heir to the throne of his father. Third, it effectively excluded the 
major opposition candidate, Gilchrist Olympio, the charismatic leader of the major 
opposition party ‘Union des Forces du Changement’ (UFC) from the electoral process, 
by stipulating that a precondition for the candidacy would be at least one year residence 
in Togo before the elections. But Gilchrist Olympio, son of the murdered first Togolese 
head of state, Sylvanus Olympio, had been driven into political exile by various 
attempts on his life during previous electoral campaigns, notably in May 1992, when he 
was ambushed nearby Soudou in the North of the country, presumably by a military unit 
led by Ernest Gnassingbé, eldest son of Eyadéma. Whereas four of Olympio’s 
entourage died, he himself could narrowly escape, seriously wounded over the Benin 
border.
At first, the opposition as well as African peers of the Togolese head of state 
were unanimous in rejecting this second ‘constitutional coup’ of the Gnassingbé-
Regime. Violent civil unrest in Lomé and other provincial capitals was accompanied by 
threats with sanctions by the international donor community, the ECOWAS and the AU. 
Both organisations imposed sanctions on Togo. The AU chairman, the former Malian 
president Alpha Oumar Konaré, branded the new rulers in Lomé as a ‘new type of 
mercenaries called constitutionalists’ who would never consent in free elections if 
remaining in power. The then Nigerian head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, even 
threatened with military intervention. On February 25, Fauré Gnassingbé yielded under 
the combined pressure of internal and external opposition. He resigned as head of state, 
and the parliament designated one of the loyalists of the RPT, the deputy speaker of the 
parliament, Abass Bonfoh, as new interim president. 
Although the illegal constitutional changes of February were revised, those of 
the constitutional coup of December 2002 remained, thus excluding again the major 
contender of the power base of the Ganssingbés. Early presidential elections were set 
for April 24. An extraordinary party congress of the RPT voted unanimously for Faure 
Gnassingbé as its leader and candidate for the upcoming presidential election. His major 
contender Olympio being barred from candidacy, the opposition was at pains to agree 
upon a new candidate. The six major opposition parties, disparagingly labelled ‘radical 
opposition’ by the ruling powers, agreed again on the 74 years old vice-president of the 
UFC, Emmanuel Bob Akintani as their common candidate for the presidential race, as 
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during the fraudulent 2003 presidential elections. Political repression and civil unrest, 
instigated mainly by newly created armed militia in favour of the ruling party, created a 
climate of countrywide despair and distrust. This was even deplored by the established 
Christian churches. Guided by Archbishop Philippe Fanoko Kpodzro, they 
demonstrated once more their engagement for peaceful conflict resolution, like in the 
violent transition period of the early 1990s. In a public march of priests in full ordinate 
to the presidency they demanded to halt the violent conflicts which had already resulted 
in the loss of many lives. In addition they appealed to end the instrumentalization of 
ethnicity and xenophobia for political ends and demanded the rescheduling of the 
election, because major preconditions of free and fair elections (like security and the 
revision of the heavily biased electoral list) could not be guaranteed in the short pre-
election period. The Togolese Bar Association and national as well as international 
human rights NGOs supported these demands. These fell however on deaf ears, both on 
the side of the government and the ECOWAS, which had offered to supervise the 
electoral process. In view of growing violent conflicts all over West Africa the latter 
was mainly interested in political stability. Robust guarantees for free and fair elections, 
as demanded by the opposition with reference to the broken promises of the past, 
including military safeguards for the protection of voters, provided by international 
security forces, were denied by the ECOWAS or other relevant international bodies. 
The interim government, which had demonstrated already its partial stand during the 
run-up to the elections, and its so-called ‘independent’ national electoral commission 
(CENI), were commissioned with the organisation of the elections, including the highly 
contested revision of the electoral roles. The leaders of the so-called ‘radical 
opposition’, Gilchrist Olympio (UFC), Yawovi Agboyibo (Comité d'Action pour le 
Renouveau, CAR), Léopold Gnininvi (Convention des Peuples Africaines, CDPA), 
Tchessa Abi (Pacte Socialiste pour le Renouveau, PSR), Nagandja Kampatib 
(Développement Intégral, ADDI) und Antoine .Folly (Union des Démocrates 
Socialistes du Togo, UDS-Togo), were barred from participating in the election 
organisation by the interim government. They formed an electoral alliance and 
demanded (in-vain) from the government and the ECOWAS a postponement of the 
election date in order to create the preconditions for fair and free elections, notably an 
unbiased electoral role and viable election cards.
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Three days before the polling day even Interior Minister François Boko from 
the northern Togo's Kabiyé ethnic group, a former ally of Eyadéma, pleaded without 
avail for a postponement. In view of the grossly flawed electoral preparations, including 
a highly contested electoral list, he recommended to appoint a prime minister of a 
transitional government which should rule the country for one to two years while a new 
constitution was drawn up. Otherwise Togo was heading for a "suicidal electoral 
process", given the high levels of pre-electoral bloody confrontations threatened to 
escalate into a veritable civil war. The reaction of the interim government was as rapid 
as predictable. Boko was deposed with immediate effect, and had to apply for political 
asylum with the German embassy in view of threats against his life. Shortly afterwards 
the German Cultural Institute in Lomé (Goethe-Institute) got torched by unknown 
forces as a kind of advance warning.
3.1 Political campaigning 
Campaigning and the elections itself, which took place on April 24, 2005, were marred 
by blatant irregularities and excesses of violence, notably in urban centres and in the 
South, like stuffing of ballot boxes on a large scale, theft of ballot boxes in opposition 
headquarters by military personnel, and some 700 polling stations destroyed. Parallel 
structures of the opposition and civic rights groups, like the National Council for 
Election Supervision (CONEL), created already during the 2003 presidential elections 
to counteract electoral fraud on all levels of public vote counting, were obstructed or 
destroyed. Armed raids of the headquarters of the opposition, seizure of computers 
meant to collate and check the poll results, a nationwide shutting down of 
telecommunication and internet gateways, including obstruction of the phone, fax and 
mobile phone net during the decisive three days (including polling day), were 
accompanied by a biased pro-government media policy. On April 26 the supposedly 
Independent National Election Commission (CENI) announced the preliminary results 
and the victory of Faure Gnassingbé with doubtful 60% of votes. Thereupon, angry 
supporters of the opposition took to the streets and confronted the security forces and 
pro-government militia by acts of counter violence. 
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3.2 Election results 
On June 3 the Constitutional Court in Lomé, dominated by Eyadéma-followers, which 
had already given their blessing for the doubtful constitutional revisions of the past and 
who were known for their biased statements from foregoing elections, confirmed the 
official election results reported by the CENI: they accorded 60,1% of votes for the 
incumbent, and 38,3% for the major opposition candidate Bob Akitani; the official 
acknowledged number of registered voters was 3,599,306, and voter turnout 2,288,279 
or 63,6% (invalid votes: 88,005, cf. table 1). Just one day later Faure Gnassingbé was 
sworn in as new president. His occult initiation was effected secretly already before in 
Kara, the fief of the Gnassingbé family, to honour the tradition of occult politics of the 
father.
However, calculations of the opposition and of independent international 
NGOs, which had followed up the voting process by its own monitoring system, 
revealed a completely different result. According to extrapolations by the French NGO 
Survie France, the candidate Akitani won the election with 72%, against 26% for his 
adversary, even if one would consider only part of electoral cheating committed by pro-
Table 1: Togo - Presidential elections of April 24, 2005 
(Official election results)
- Registered voters: 3,599.306 
- Total number of votes: 2,288,279 (63,6%) 
- Invalid votes: 88.005 
- Valid votes: 2,200,274 
- F. Gnassingbé (RPT): 1,325,622 (60,15%) 
- Bob-Akitani (UFC) 841,642 (38,25%) 
- N. Lawson (PRR) 1,04% 
- H. Olympio (RSDD) 0,55% 
Source. http://africanelections.tripod.com/tg.html; May 30, 2005
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Eyadéma forces. The ‘radical opposition’ protested in vain against the ‘stolen elections’, 
and Akitani declared himself the true president on April 27, 2005.
The ECOWAS, which nominated 120 of the total of 230 accredited election 
observers meant to supervise the elections, maintained the general creditability of the 
election results, although it admitted some abnormalities and incidences5, a position 
which was shared immediately by the French government. Whereas most of the election 
observers, who arrived the day before polling and left before the counting was finished, 
confirmed uncritically the validity of the count and the general credibility of the 
electoral process, diplomatic observers of the EU as well as international NGOs, like the 
Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH), doubted the 
official results. A confidential report of four high ranking EU diplomats launched to the 
public on June 6, 2005 listed the following indicators of massive electoral fraud: 
inflated number of registered voters by 34% or 900,000 ghost voters on the ‘revised’ 
electoral list6, most of them in RPT strongholds, whereas the opposition complained 
that many of their members were denied registration7. Another creditability gap existed 
in the official statistics concerning the rate of electoral participation, reported with 80% 
to 90% in the (pro-Eyadéma) North, and 35% in the opposition strongholds. 
3.3. Post-election issues 
According to a report of the Togolese Human Rights Organisation ‘Ligue Togolaise de 
Droit de l'Homme’ (LTDH), published on May 13, excesses of violence since the 
passing of Eyadéma, notably during the electoral process, resulted in more than 800 
death and 4,500 injured. Although the frontiers to the neighbouring Ghana and Benin 
remained closed from 22.4. to 6.5.2005, continuing political persecution triggered a 
mass exodus of political refugees. The UNHCR counted more than 34,000 refugees in
Benin and Ghana until end of May 2005.
5 ECOWAS/CEDEAO: ‚Ce scrutin a globalement répondu aux critères et principes universellement admis 
en matière d’élections’, quoted in: ai (2005): Togo – Une élection à hauts risques. Amnesty international, 
Lomé, 20.05.05:4. 
6 The Demographer Thérèse Locoh, director of research of the l'INED (Paris), retained in an unpublished 
contribution "Démographie, démocratie au Togo", an even more blatant fraud of over 1,100,000 
Phantom- voters  (http://www.survie-france.org/article.php3?id_article=485; 07.06.05).
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Mediation efforts of the AU and ECOWAS to solve the post-election crisis by 
proposing a government of national unity started immediately after the elections. But 
they failed, due to the uncompromising attitude of Faure Gnassingbé, who acted from a 
position of strength and, although formally agreeing on limited power sharing, insisted 
on his newly gained legitimacy as elected head of state. AU president and Nigerian 
leader Olusegun Obasanjo, who brokered two meetings between Gnassingbé and his 
contender, Gilchrist Olympio, invited the bitterly divided parties to the Nigerian capital 
Abuja for reconciliation talks. But neither he nor the acting head of ECOWAS, Niger’s 
president Mamadou Tandja, succeeded in resolving the dangerous stalemate between 
the political adversaries. 
Instead, Gnassingbé continued successfully the policy of divide and rule of his 
father in splitting the opposition. He convinced the 67 year old ambitious veteran 
politician Edem Kodjo, former economist, founding member of the RPT and secretary 
general of the OAU, since the early 1990s leader of a small ‘moderate’ opposition party 
‘Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine’ (CPP), to act as Prime Minister of a new 30 
member cabinet in May 2005. Thus Faure copied the same procedure which his father 
already had employed successfully in 1994, when Kodjo entered the government of the 
late Eyadéma as Prime Minister, sidelining his stronger rivals in the oppositions 
coalition against established parliamentary procedures, which reserved the seat of the 
Prime Minister for representatives of the largest opposition party. 
However, the strategic posts in the new government, labelled government of 
‘national coalition’, remained in the hands of relatives and hardline loyalists of the 
Gnassingbé clan. Kpatcha Gnassingbé, elder half-brother of the head of state, was 
appointed defence minister, assisted by his younger brother, Rock Gnassinbé, chief of 
an elite unit of the army. A close friend of the family, a Kabiyé from Kara as well, 
colonel Pitalouna-Ani Laokpessi, commander of the paramilitary gendarmerie in the 
1990s, frequently accused by the opposition of torturing political prisoners, became 
Security Minister. Payadowa Boukpessi, former minister for Telecommunication in the 
Eyadéma government, also close to the Gnassingbés, was nominated Minister of 
Economy, Finance and Privatisation. Minister of Telecommunications became another 
friend of Faure, Koukouvi Dogbé, assisted by the young brother of the president, May 
7 allAfrica.com: ‚Togo – Diplomatic documents surface citing fraud in April poll’, 6.6.2005; 
ufctogo.com: ‚Présidentielle 2005 – les mécanismes de la fraude’. 5.5.05).
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Gnassingbé (25 years), as deputy director general of ‘Togotélécom’. Apart from Zarifou 
Ayéva, leader of the small opposition party ‘Parti pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau’ 
(PDR), who was rewarded with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only four members of 
the opposition could be convinced to enter minor cabinet posts. Thus the government of 
stalwarts of the RPT and a handful of opposition defectors consolidated the power base 
of the Gnassingbé regime which continued to rule the country like its personal fiefdom 
to the detriment of national reconciliation. The scope of manoeuvre of Kodjo’s cabinet 
became further restricted by an informal ‘kitchen cabinet’ of the president, composed of 
his defence minister and senior brother Kpatcha, labelled ‘vice president’ by the 
population, his cabinet director Pascal Bodjona, former leader of the militant pro-
government student movement HACAME, later nominated ambassador in Washington 
by Eyadéma, and two powerful personal counsellors, Pitang Tchalla, former Minister of 
communication under Eyadéma, and the opaque French lawyer Charles Debbasch, 
searched by an international warrant of the French justice, who had already advised 
Eyadéma in the previous years in staging his constitutional coup. 
Once the grip on power was assured, the government tried to come to terms 
with the opposition, as this was one of the preconditions of resuming EU aid, which 
insisted on the 22 commitments made by the Eyadéma government to the EU in April 
2004, in order to promote democratisation. In July Gnassingbé and Olympio held talks 
under the auspices of the ‘Sant’Egidio’ Community in Rome and pledged to end 
violence, to secure the return of the refugees and to free political prisoners. A follow-up 
meeting was held in Rome in November to evaluate the implementation of the forgoing 
recommendations. One week later the head of state started a new phase of national 
dialogue, including representatives of the three major parties of the ‘radical opposition’ 
(UFC, CAR, PDR), to agree upon a framework for early local and parliamentary 
elections and a revised electoral code. Although the president showed formal signs of 
flexibility, e. g. in offering talks with or without external mediators at a place even 
outside of the country, sustainable reconciliation was unlikely in foreseeable future. 
Whereas the major opposition parties called for a repetition of the rigged presidential 
election as well as a return to the 1992 constitution and to the electoral code of 2000, 
the RPT majority in parliament persevered the amendments of the 2002 ‘constitutional 
coup’ and of the code, as these favoured the ruling party, and of course both the 
government and the parliament underlined the legitimacy of the elected president. 
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The defence minister Kpatcha Gnassinbé started end of August to replace a 
number of army commanders, following recommendations of the ‘Sant’Egidio’ 
dialogue, which a. o. proposed to reorganise the military in order to render it more 
accountable. Whether these measures would enhance accountability was open to 
question, as he installed the key positions of the army, overwhelmingly composed of 
Kabiyé (about 7,000 of a total of 13,000), again with similar loyalists: the majority of 
the commanders of the operational units were born in Pya. This tradition was cherished 
with the nomination of Béréna Gnankoudè as chief of the general staff of the army, 
which commanded also elite corps directed by other brothers of the Gnassingbés. The 
brother in law of the president, Félix Abalo Kadanga, became commander of the Rapid 
Intervention Force (FIR); according to a confidential UN-report he was implied in 
several atrocities committed during the electoral process earlier in this year. The new 
commander of the presidential guard (RCGP, the renowned Bérets verts, i.e. ‘green 
berets’), Bali Wiyao, originated equally from Pya. The Kabiyé Lemou Tchalo replaced 
Ernest Gnassingbé, the eldest son of Eyadéma, retired because of chronic illness, as 
chief of the parachutist regiment (RPC, ‘red berets’) of Kara, notorious for its human 
rights violations in the past. Thus, the army, together with reinforced or newly formed 
paramilitary militias (originating mostly from student organisations like the HACAME) 
and private policing units and security firms (including the Security Advisory and 
Services, SAS-Togo, owned by the notorious French businessman and arms dealer 
Robert Montoya, former member of an anti-terrorist unit of the Elysée, Paris), both 
closely interwoven with the army structure, continued to be the major pillar of the 
power of the Gnassingbé clan. 
Although civic unrest calmed down in the second half of the year, and 460 
political prisoners were freed in early November, the political climate remained tense. 
Despite repeated insurances of the government that the refugees could return without 
being persecuted or victimized, the number of people fleeing Togo in the aftermath of 
election violence still increased up to August, when the UNHCR counted 24,500 
refugees in Benin and 15,500 in Ghana, whereas the World Food Programme (WFP, 
Rome) called on 15.7. for urgent help for even 66,500 people forced from their homes, 
including 18,500 displaced, scattered over local host communities in Benin and Ghana 
and 10,000 internal refugees. The majority of refugees were young men from the south,
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the region held to be the heartland of the opposition. While some of them went home 
during the following month, still more than 19,000 preferred to live in the refugee 
camps of Benin (10,960 in Come and Agame camps and 8,130 in Cotonou) at the end of 
the year, in fear of their safety at home. In the Ghanaian Krisan refugee camp conditions 
deteriorated because of seeming lack of protection against Togolese agents-
provocateurs or spies, in view of the alleged ambiguous attitude of the Ghanaian 
security forces and of the government in Accra, accused of collaboration with Lomé. 
This caused nearly half of the population, about 800 refugees mostly from Togo, to 
leave the camp in November for Elubo, further west at the Ivorian border. Between 300 
and 500 of these ‘double refugees’, including families with young children, hid in 
groups of 60 or 70 in the wild swamplands surrounding the Krishan camp still in 
December 2005 in fear of persecution. 
Following up accusations of grave human rights violations in the aftermath of 
the coup d’état and the fraudulent electoral process, first made by the LTDH in 
collaboration with the ‘Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme’ (FIDH, Paris) 
in May, other international human rights bodies were at least as critical. Based on 
numerous eye-witness reports, collected in the refugee camps of Benin, amnesty 
international published in July 2005 a scathing critique of atrocities and impunity of 
their perpetrators, condoned by the new Gnassingbé regime in its report entitled ‘Togo –
will history repeat itself?’, comparing the situation with the brutal repression during the 
presidential elections of 1998, and underlining the special responsibility of Paris, 
because of its long-standing ties of military aid and cooperation with Lomé. Following 
appeals of the AU and the international donor community the UN dispatched also a 
team of investigators to probe allegations of widespread killings, torture, abductions and 
political repression. In its report released in August 2005, the UN estimated that more 
than 400 people had been killed during the electoral violence, putting most of the blame 
on the security forces and pro-government militia, instigated by the military to act with 
outmost brutality against suspected opponents, providing state-owned vehicles for 
transport of armed militia, and cutting telephone lines, thus making it impossible for the 
victims to call for help. But also opposition activists were severely blamed for their 
‘strategy of conquering power by deliberate violence disregarding the disastrous 
consequences’. The FIDH followed with an own report in November, deploring once 
again the impunity of perpetrators, the lack of human rights commitment of the new 
18
regime in general and of the judicial system in particular. Apparently, the much awaited 
report of the ‘independent’ National Special Commission of Inquiry (CNSEI), set up in 
May as official Togolese response to the growing critique of the regime, chaired by 
former Prime Minister Josepf Koffigoh, did not come up to the expectations of the 
international community. Published in November after more than four-months long 
inquiry, it pretended that only 154 people were killed and 654 hurt, but it castigated the 
active complicity of the RPT with the perpetrators of excesses of violence and called on 
the government to charge and try the guilty; a list of suspects was handed over to the 
government. 
In the following year resumed the inter-Togolese dialogue, sponsored by the 
EU to overcome the political crisis. The talks constituted one of the preconditions for 
continuing development cooperation with the EU and other major donors, suspended in 
1993. Yawovi Agboyibo, leader of the opposition party ‘Comité d'Action pour le 
Renouveau’ (CAR), was on 22 April elected as chairman of the resumed dialogue, in 
which all major political parties as well as delegates from two women’s organisations 
(traditionally in favour of Eyadéma) were meant to participate. However, two of the 
largest opposition parties, the ‘Union des Forces du Changement’ (UFC) led by 
Gilchrist Olympio and the ‘Convention des Peuples Africaines’ (CDPA), presided over 
by Léopold Gnininvi, boycotted the reopening of the dialogue because they had vainly 
demanded the presence of an impartial foreign mediator, as already conceded by the 
president in 2005. The major aim of the negotiations was the preparation for early 
legislative elections. To guarantee an impartial poll, additional items placed on the 
agenda were the revision of the electoral code, the voters’ register and the constitution; 
the reorganisation of the independent electoral commission (‘Commission Électorale 
Nationale Indépendante’ ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
favour of the ruling ‘Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais’ (RPT) party and the
Gnassingbé clan; and last but not least, an end to impunity for perpetrators of violence 
and politically motivated killings. 
The deadlock between the government and opposition was finally broken by the 
mediation of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. After a ten-day meeting in 
Ouagadougou, all parties signed a comprehensive political agreement on 20 August 
2006. This ‘Ouagadougou accord’ provided for a transitional government of national 
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unity and the organisation of early free and fair parliamentary elections by a truly 
independent CENI before October 2007, i.e., before the mandate of parliament, based 
on an undemocratic election in 2002 that had been boycotted by the opposition, ran out. 
It remained unclear, however, whether the agreement on credible legislative elections 
would also apply to the next presidential elections. This would have been of special 
importance to the UFC in view of another key part of the Ouagadougou accord, namely 
the abolition of the rigid residence requirement and of the exclusion of dual nationality 
for eligible candidates, imposed in the election law and the constitutional amendments 
of December 2002 in order to prevent the election of Gilchrist Olympio as president. 
The deal opened the way for the formation of a new transitional government of 
national reconciliation headed by Yawovi Agboyibo, the veteran leader of CAR, the 
second largest opposition party. His nomination as prime minister by the head of state in 
September 2006 was strongly contested by the UFC, which believed it had the rightful 
claim to the post, being the largest opposition party. Again, Faure Gnassingbé had fallen 
back on the tactics of his father, who had split the opposition with a similar trick in 
1994 when, in violation of the parliamentary rules, he had nominated Edem Kodjo, head 
of a minority opposition party, as prime minister, instead of Agboyibo, the leader of 
what was then the largest opposition party, CAR. Agboyibo now replaced Kodjo, who 
had been reappointed as head of the first nominal government of national unity 
(boycotted by the major opposition parties) in June 2005. The national press lauded 
Agboyibo’s appointment as a positive measure to seal the Ouagadougou deal. 
The new transitional government, nominated by the prime minister on 20 
September 2006, comprised 39 members (five more than the old cabinet), with 
representatives of all major players in the Ouagadougou accord, apart from the UFC, 
which again refused to take part, although it participated in the new CENI set up in 
October. However, the most powerful portfolios remained in the hands of the RPT and 
the Gnassingbé clan. Kpatcha Gnassingbé, elder half-brother of the head of state and 
head of the militia that had contributed to the bloody conflicts of April 2005, was 
appointed defence minister. Col. Atcha Titikpina (RPT), former head of the presidential 
guard (the so-called ‘Green Berets’) and equally accused of masterminding the 
atrocities of April 2005, became minister of security. Payadowa Boukpessi (RPT) 
remained finance minister and Kokouvi Dogbé (RPT) minister of telecommunications. 
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The latter was of particular importance in the organisation and monitoring of the 
forthcoming elections, as shown by the crucial role of telecommunications in rigging 
the last presidential elections of 2005. To guard his rear, the head of state formed a sort 
of parallel cabinet directed by Pascal Bodjona (RPT), former Togolese ambassador in 
Washington. Other members were the former minister of security and RPT hardliner, 
Col. Pitalouna-Ani Laokpessi, who was compensated for the loss of his portfolio by his 
nomination on 16 December as special councillor for security at the presidency, where 
he rejoined other old hands like Edem Kodjo, nominated as minister of state at the 
presidency, and former minister of foreign affairs Kokou Tozoun, promoted to the post 
of rapporteur of CENI, a post of some strategic importance in view of the upcoming 
elections. 
The most important, yet unresolved point of the Ouagadougou accord remained 
the reform of the army, at the heart of the empire around the Gnassingbé clan. In view 
of its clouded image, the army chief, General Zakary Nandja, on 28 August assured 
both the head of state and the international community that he backed the Ouagadougou 
accord and would abstain from interfering in the political arena. Nothing was less 
certain, however. Apparently, there was a fragile equilibrium between different factions 
within the Gnassingbé family and among competing clans in the army, all of them 
jealously guarding their prerogatives. It remained to be seen whether the head of state 
had sufficient authority and determination to effect the required changes. In April, the 
draft code of conduct for the armed forces and security services of West African states, 
a joint project of ECOWAS and the Centre for the Control of the Armed Forces in 
Geneva, was approved during a meeting in Lomé, serving as a reminder to the army 
about its supposed new role. 
The human rights situation remained precarious. According to UNHCR, up till 
October 2006 less than half the 40,000 refugees who had fled the post-electoral violence 
and persecution in 2005 had voluntarily returned or been repatriated from neighbouring 
Benin and Ghana. A total of 16,500 remained in exile, fearing political reprisal. In
spring 2006, the eastern and Volta regions of Ghana were ‘invaded’ by a second wave 
of migrants. Despite assurances from the Togolese government, several returning 
refugees had been arrested or harassed and were forced to flee a second time, now in the 
company of additional relatives. They remained in the transit and refugee camps of 
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Abotase, Digya and Manchere or scattered across 114 villages in the Volta region, 
where they faced acute shortages of food, water and shelter. In December 2006, the EU 
granted Togo € 14.6 m to assist in the strengthening of reception and reintegration 
facilities.
4. Democratization and economic performance
4.1 Economic performance and general well-being  
Economic performance in the aftermath of the political unrest of 2005 was mixed due to 
counteracting factors, notably the volatility of Togo’s economy to external shocks in 
general, and to the side effects of the continuing Ivorian crisis in particular. The tertiary 
sector grew by about 7%, probably a side effect of the trade diversion from Abidjan to 
the port of Lomé. However, in general economic growth still lagged behind regional 
averages, both of the UEMOA (WEAMU) and total Sub-Saharan Africa. On average 
real per capita GDP in Togo declined by almost 1% per year since 1990 (cf. Table 3, 
and IMF 2007:4). Its human development index worsened as well in the past decade. In 
2005, the government failed again to meet major UEMOA convergence criteria, e.g. 
concerning public debt and the non-accumulation of debt arrears. In view of the 
continuing political crisis and the subsequent suspension of development cooperation of 
major donors, fundamental changes in the foreseeable future were unlikely. The 
remedy, i.e. access to the HIPIC initiative for heavily indebted poor countries, for which 
Togo would be eligible in principle, was linked with the fulfilment of the political 
conditions for aid, imposed by the EU and other donors. 
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Table 2 & 3: Togo’s economic decline and export performance (Source IMF 2007:4)
Table 3: Econom ic grow th has lagged regional averages.
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Table 4: Export performance has been hampered by real effective exchange rate 
appreciation and terms of trade deterioration.
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Export performance was generally hampered by a real effective exchanger rate 
appreciation of the Franc CFA (pegged to the Euro), due to an overvaluation of the CFA 
vis à vis the US$ of over 35% since 2000, as well as terms of trade deterioration (cf. 
Table 4, and IMF 2007:4). Previsions for the key foreign currency earning sectors 
deteriorated with a sharp decline in cotton and phosphate exports (up to –50% for cotton 
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and -21,5% for phosphate in the first 10 month of 2005). This was due to lack of 
incentives for cotton farmers caused by delays in payment during the past two seasons 
on the one hand, and the withdrawal of private management from the joint venture 
fertilizer production (IFG-Togo), linked to difference between the government and the 
foreign private managers on the misappropriation of funds two years ago, on the other. 
In addition, the problem of unsustainable public debt, caused by corrupt and 
inefficient governance since decades, continued and was even aggravated by the cut off 
of donor support. Total public debt was almost 115% of GDP in 2005, a quarter of 
which was domestic (cf. IMF 2007:5). The state-owned banking sector suffered from 
the highest share of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the UEMOA, reflecting doubtful 
direct lending to the phosphate and cotton sector in the past (cf. IMF 2007:6). Public 
sector salary arrears persisted and, with it, strike threats by Togo’s major labour union, 
the ‘Intersyndical des Travailleurs de Togo’ (ISTT) during the whole year of 2006. To 
mitigate labour unrest, parliament adopted a new labour code in December. Its 
stipulations offered, at least formally, greater protection and better employment 
conditions, including a 40-hour week and equal pay for equal work. The stock of 
external debt increased to US$ 1.8 bn at the end of 2006, overwhelmingly due to the 
accumulation of repayment arrears (some $ 100 m). 
In September 2005 Togo was rated as the seventh most strenuous nation of 155 
countries worldwide to do business, according the “Doing Business in 2006” report of 
the World Bank. As in the case of five other members of UEMOA, which equally 
ranked at the bottom 11, its political and administrative operating environment 
constituted a barrier to the growth of private direct investment and private-sector
activities. In a similar vain, Togo was for the first time ever included in the annual 
Corruption Perception Index of the international NGO Transparency International one 
year later, and being ranked the third most corrupt UEMOA state, at the bottom end 
(rank 130) of 163 countries worldwide. 
Deteriorating public finance and wrong political priorities eroded the financial 
base of public health service and education even further (cf. IMF 2007:29). The decline 
of the education system had started already in the 1980s. Whereas Togo could boast of 
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the highest rate of primary school enrolment up to 1980 with 72%, things changed when 
the public sector stopped to guarantee the employment of the students after 1981. 
Enrolment went down to 52% in 1984 (cf. Lange 1987) and staggered around 60% in 
1994 (cf. WB 1996). In addition there existed a significant and persistent gender 
difference. 
The economic decline, mainly caused by severe and enduring governance 
problems, affected not only opponents of the regime but large segments of the 
population. Poverty has deepened in the past decades, both in depth and severity. It was 
most pronounced in the rural areas and in the Northern Regions, affecting over 70% of 
households in the Savanes and almost 60% in the Kara region (cf. WB 1996: ii). But 
growing pockets of extreme poverty exist in the urban areas as well, including Lomé. 
Although this was not peculiar to Togo but to be observed in other African LDCs too, 
there existed one vulnerable group specific to Togo: displaced families, including those 
forcibly evicted by the government for the purpose of the creation of national parks 
without compensation8, as well as for the exploitation of the phosphate mines (Vo 
district in the South), and victims of the civic unrest in the pre-election period of the 
1993 presidential elections (cf. WB 1996).
For the dependents of the some 60,000 thousand political refugees, only 
reluctantly returning from neighbouring in 2006, i.e. the elderly, women and children 
left behind, life became even more difficult. Still five month after the violent electoral 
conflicts, many homes and property destroyed still lacked repair, there was no money to 
pay the school fees, and prices for maize, the major staple crops of the poor, rocketed in 
July because of lack of supply for local markets, apparently there was considerable 
trafficking of food stuffs to neighbouring drought-ridden Sahelian countries, but also to 
Ghana and Gabun, where wholesalers could earn larger profits. 
8 e.g gross human rights violations during the imposition of the Kéran natural reserve in 
the North, as revealed during the National Conference of 1991 and condemned by 
different reports of amnesty international.
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4.2 Limits and prospects for democratic consolidation 
Although the political environment has improved since 2006 with the implementation of 
the national dialogue on reconciliation as required by the EU, the installation of an 
interim prime minister and a national unity government, and the preparing of free 
parliamentary elections on October 14, 2007, the perspectives of sustainable 
democratization are still rather bleak. Whether the established power elite will condone 
in handing over their cherished semi-feudal privileges to freely elected representatives 
of the people is doubtful. The international donor community will probably be satisfied 
with formal steps of democratisation, like transparent parliamentary elections, and 
resume aid. The increasing competition with new global players, notably China and 
other Asian powers, for Africa’s natural resources, renders the insistence of Western 
donors on political conditions of aid, like ‘good governance’ and respect for basic 
human rights, increasingly illusory. Western donor countries and international aid 
agencies complaint about the negative impact of China’s and India’s mounting 
economic and political influence on Sub-Saharan Africa. It allegedly counteracted the 
Western donor’s development orientated foreign and development policy by neo-
mercantilist trade strategies, thereby displacing African local production and fostering 
other Dutch disease implications (cf. Zafar 2007; Umbach 2007:1; Broadman 2007). 
But Chinese aid and foreign trade policy only honoured established international norms 
of non-interference in internal politics. And with respect to development cooperation, 
Peking and Delhi rather promoted Smithsonian ethics, cherished over centuries by 
European (colonial) governments, i.e. the growth of the wealth of nations, 
notwithstanding the accumulation of wealth by governing elites to the detriment of the 
poor. Under these conditions, geo-political considerations and tactics of the Cold War 
area will be increasingly honoured even by the more critical EU members like 
Germany. In addition, the internal opposition is still divided, and the civil society 
weakened by decades of resistance to the oppression. The most important to the larger 
share of the population will be the improvement of their economic situation and of 
individual well-being. 
In this respect the perspectives of the normal Togolese citizen are promising. 
Even small countries like Togo profited from the newly gained independence in 
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international relations, and increased bargaining power, provided by the quest of Asian 
super powers for African resources and emerging markets. Sub-Saharan Africa actually 
experience its longest growth phase for 35 years: On average, Africa will grow with 
about 6% in 2007, well above the long-term trend for the fifth consecutive year. This 
will have spread effects to Togo as well, independently of its advances in the 
democratization process, although Togo still drags behind with a moderate growth of 
estimated 2% in 2006. But broad money supply grew already by 22% in the same year, 
because of a surge in remittances and trade-related capital inflows, probably due to the 
improved political situation (cf. African Research Bulletin, May 16th to June 15th 2007). 
The growing competition between China and Western powers, all of them keen 
to enlarge their resource base in Africa, was also felt in relations with Togo, notably by 
the shuttle diplomacy of the head of state and the confirmation of strong ties of 
economic cooperation between Togo and China. Faure Gnassingbé visited Beijing in 
January 2006. He and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed to enhance their long-
standing bilateral ties in such fields as agriculture, trade, telecommunications and 
infrastructure. In April 2006, the new multimillion dollar presidential palace in Lomé, 
with over 40 offices and banqueting halls and already contracted and built by the 
Chinese under the late President Eyadéma, was inaugurated. The cordial relationship 
was confirmed by his son’s attendance of the Beijing Sino-African summit on 3-5 
November. On 22 July, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Qinghong signed a number of 
technical cooperation agreements in Kara, including grants and interest-free loans from 
the Chinese government for funding projects and a framework agreement on 
preferential loans for the realisation of the Adjarala hydro-electric project. During the 
China Business Days in Lomé in November, organised by the ‘Banque Ouest Africaine 
de Développement’ (BOAD) with the help of UEMOA and the BCEAO, BOAD signed 
two cooperation agreements, one on Chinese technical assistance with BOAD (approx. 
€ 1 m) and another for a credit line of € 70 m between BOAD and the Chinese Exim 
Bank for development of infrastructure, exploitation of energy resources and 
construction projects in West Africa, including Togo. In August of the same year an 
Indian investment holding company signed an agreement with the government in Lomé 
for investments worth € 40 m in the mining sector. In particular, this covered iron ore 
deposits at Bassar in the Kara region (estimated at 600 m tonnes), besides chromite ore 
(1 m tonnes) at Farendè (Kara) and Mont Ayito in Plateau region and manganese (13 m 
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tonnes) at Naéga (Savannes region). The agreement would also involve the construction 
of a 100 km railway and development of energy and water supplies. 
Finally, the badly needed resumption of EU development aid alone would 
involve up to € 60 m. The Ouagadougou accord of August 2006 triggered the clearance 
of € 15 m of previously allocated Stabex funds, thus extending EU aid for the current 
year to over € 36 m. A further € 41.6 m was promised if a date for the legislative 
elections was fixed. But the EU reminded President Gnassingbé, that development 
cooperation would not be normalised without the establishment of a legitimate National 
Assembly. In November, the EU council of ministers dangled the clearance of € 40 m of 
the 9th EDF as well as the inclusion of a further € 110 m in the programming for the 
10th EDF (2008-12). The resumption of EU aid was the more important, as it was 
considered as a precondition for continuation of IMF negotiations on poverty reduction 
and growth facilities, which, in turn, would allow for seeking debt relief with the Paris 
Club under the HIPC scheme and the new multilateral debt relief initiative.
5. Theoretical implications: failed democratization is worse than no democratization
According to recent literature on the linkage of democratization on growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the emergent democratic institutions have had a negligible direct effect 
on economic growth9. The case study on Togo presented, would confirm this hypothesis 
at first sight. Yet, it will be challenged out of methodological reasons.
The holding of early parliamentary elections on October 14, 2007, probably the 
first free and fair elections in Togo since decades, are considered internationally as a 
litmus test of despotic African regimes propensity to change towards democratization. 
Since the early 1990s political development in Togo has been closely watched, not only 
by African peers and their regional organisations (ECOWAS and AU), but also by the 
international donor community, notably by the EU. The latter was deeply engaged in 
9 For recent examples of studies on the linkage of democratization and economic development with an 
focus on Africa cf. Rodrik & Wacziarg 2005; Papaioannou 2005; Nel 2005, McKay et al 2004; Nulu & 
O’Connell 1999; Barro 1996
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electoral assistance as well as in the observation of the past presidential elections, which 
nevertheless utterly failed to meet even the most basic requirements of multi party rule. 
The 22 democratic commitments made by the Togolese government to the EU within 
the framework of the Brussels accord of April 2004 formed the base of a lengthy and 
controversial process of national reconciliation which recommenced in April last year. 
Possibly because of its small size and lack of importance in international politics, 
Western donors took Togo as model to test their approach of political conditionality of 
aid, which had been emphasised as corner stone of the joint EU-Africa strategy adopted 
in December 2005 to ensure peace, security and good governance. 
Without any doubt the economic and political sanctions imposed on Togo 
within the framework of aid conditionality since 1993, and that more consequently than 
in most other African states, were felt by the regime in Lomé and by the Togolese 
population. The economic decline within the past decade was last, but not least, due to 
the disengagement of major donors (cf. IMF 2007). Government and opposition alike 
repeatedly complained that the population was most likely to suffer under the cut off of 
donor support. Therefore, both requested the resumption of aid, although with different 
institutions, partners and methods (cf. Kohnert/Mönikes 1996). The opponents of the 
regime maintained that failed democratization, notably if punished with ill-applied aid 
conditionality, is worse than no democratization (cf. Kohnert 2005). Yet, the results of 
aid conditionality can not provide answers to the controversial discussion of the 
scholarly question on possible linkages between the form of government and economic 
growth.
In view of the relevance of informal politics and economies in West African 
countries in general, and in Togo in particular10, available data on economic 
development, income distribution or growth are highly unreliable. Therefore, systematic 
quantitative analyses of the linkage between democratization and economic 
performance or well-being of the people lack the required robust empirical data base to 
arrive at reliable results. In countries dominated by informal institutions, where more 
than half of economic activities are unrecorded (55% in the case of Togo), hidden by the 
10 In the 1990s, the informal economic sector contributed on average 41% to the non-agricultural GDP in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Benin: 41% (1993); Ghana: 58% (1988); Togo: 55% (1995)), and 29% in Latin 
America, according to estimates of the ILO (ILO 2002:24). According to Chen et al (2004), about 72% of 
total employed outside the agricultural sector were employed in the informal sector in SSA (51% in Latin 
America).
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shadow economy of the informal sector, the variance of many relevant variables due to 
(unknown) data errors can be – and most probably often is - more important than the 
variance due to the anticipated influence of other variables11. Heroic assumptions that 
the variance of the unrecorded data would be similar to that of registered data (and 
therefore negligible) is based on little evidence. Quite to the contrary, there are strong 
indicators that there exist significant, sometimes even antagonistic differences between 
the political and economic performance of actors involved in the informal sector, 
according their resource endowment and class position (cf. Kohnert 2007b). This 
applies even to the most basic economic data, like the per capita income. 
As long as more reliable data on the informal sector are not available, research 
on these topics should focus on in-depth case-studies and holistic qualitative analyses 
with ‘thick description’ (C. Geertz) instead of sophisticated but unviable large-n 
econometric cross-country or panel analyses. Besides, one should take into account the 
age old controversial debate in economics, on the impact of political regimes and 
governance on economic growth, which is characterized by a deep divide between 
different schools of thought up to date. Correspondingly, differing results of analyses on 
the linkage between democratization and development in low income countries reflect 
in many cases rather the ideological stance of the author than the reality, notably if 
applied to African conditions. 
Because of the high volatility of African LDCs to external shocks and the 
predominance of external political and economic conditions on domestic growth, a 
possible positive impact of democratization on economic prosperity may be overlaid or 
counteracted by a change in these external conditions. The doubtful reputation of Togo 
as ‘Switzerland of Africa’ under the dictatorship of Eyadéma mentioned above may 
serve as example. 
In addition, one has to take due account of the possible trade off between 
general growth, accompanied by increased income inequality, and pro-poor growth. 
This trade off is likely to occur in cases of high power concentration, the hegemony of 
11 Some authors tend to assume that informal social capital and formal organizations interact in ways that 
have rather positive outcomes, e.g. that innovative informal networks are the base for creating true 
democratic formal institutions of civil society (cf. Rose 1997, n. p; World Bank 2001:171). This might be 
true in some cases, but the opposite is true as well, informal networks can be anti democratic, insofar as 
they are used to corrupt formal institutions, the role of West African’s so-called ‘traditional’ secret 
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national power elites, and pronounced income inequality (cf. McKay et al 2004; Nel 
2005). That is, it is likely to occur in Togo too, if not prevented by a rigorous 
supervision of a sustainable pro-poor policy within the framework of IMF sponsored 
PRSP-programmes (cf. IMF 2007). Finally, growth is not the only solution: In some 
African countries, notably in those with high inequality, like the former ‘settler 
economies’ of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, even small changes in income 
distribution, enforceable politically without civic conflict, could have a significant 
larger poverty reducing impact than growth (cf. Bigsten/Shimeles (2007). Besides, it is 
likely to have positive effects on democratic transition. But the merits of 
democratization on growth (and vice versa) will be seen only in the long run (cf. 
Papaioannou & Siourounis 2005).
6. Conclusion
In summary, the particular conditions of Togo’s development over the past three 
decades do not confirm any close relationship between the form and methods of 
governance and the economic well-being of the people. Certainly, other things being 
equal, the repression by the corrupt Eyadéma-Regime has had strong negative effects on 
the majority of the opposition which suffered increasing hardship over decades, notably 
because of the enduring political crisis in the aftermath of the abortive democratic 
transition, initiated by the National Conference of 1991. To be clear about it, the 
Eyadéma-Regimes was never a development oriented dictatorship like that of Singapore 
or Uganda. The relative economic success of Togo in the 1970s and 1980s, was due to 
favourable external conditions, both in international politics (Cold War bias of 
development cooperation) and international economics (Togo’s role as transit economy) 
as explained above. Even more than a decade of aid conditionality and disengagement 
of major donors (1993-2006), failed to bring the desired results. In view of Togo’s 
hegemonic power structure, it mostly affected the opposition and the poorer sections of 
the population. Only if the international donor community is ready to learn from its past 
errors and willing to take responsibility for it, a sustainable democratic transition can 
societies like the Okija-cult of the Igbo, the Yoruba ‘Ogboni Society’ in Nigeria (cf. Kohnert 2007a), or 
the Mafia in Southern Italy or Russia are outstanding examples.
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succeed. This requires first of all continuing close supervision of the process by the EU, 
i.e. substantial security, organizational and financial intervention for the support of the 
democratic forces of Togo to guarantee fair and free elections. Afterwards a long-term 
reconstruction assistance is indispensable.
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